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Occasionally as major problems have arisen, we have prepared for members of our Board and for conference chairmen of world peace, a short history and summary of the matter at hand, together with pertinent statements and comments from various news sources. The current controversy over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, where limited war is raging, is a typical instance. Due to the crucial nature of this case and possible serious American involvement, it seems suitable on a shortened dead-line to send such a document prepared by Chicago office staff members to all COURIER subscribers in place of the regular October issue.

-The Editor

CRISIS IN THE FAR EAST

The United States and its people are now in the midst of a very tense crisis in the Far East. This crisis had its seeds in the successful Communist revolution in China which reached its climax in 1949. Not long after Chian Kai-shek and his Nationalist forces had been driven from the mainland and had taken refuge on Formosa, Communist North Korea attacked South Korea. The U. S. with United Nations support went to the aid of South Korea. Communist China intervened in that war after UN forces, mostly American, had crossed the 38th Parallel and advanced to positions near the Chinese border in an effort to unite North and South Korea by military conquest.

Due to the military situation at that time, the U. S. committed itself to defend Formosa and restrained the Nationalists to avoid any spread of the hostilities. When the Eisenhower Administration took office in 1953, it "unleashed" the Nationalists so they would be free to attack the mainland.

In 1955, after the Korean war was over, the Communist Chinese bombarded Quemoy, Matsu, and other islands near the coast which were still held by Nationalist forces. The U. S. Congress adopted a joint resolution granting the President authority to employ American armed forces to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, and such other off-shore islands as may be required for the defense of the former.

The Administration then concluded a mutual defense treaty with Chiang which only covered Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty provided that the defense arrangement would "be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement." However, Secretary Dulles said to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1955: "It is our view that an agreement to extend the coverage of the China defense treaty to additional territories would in practical terms amount to an amendment of the treaty, and should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent."

In the present situation this statement would mean that the approval of the Senate should be obtained before U. S. forces are used to defend Quemoy or Matsu. Instead, the Administration has ignored the mutual defense treaty and based its actions on the Formosa Resolution. (The 1955 tension ended with the evacuation by the Nationalists of the Tachen islands at the urging of the U. S.).

About one-third of the Nationalist army is now located on Quemoy and Matsu as a defense against the invasion of Formosa, as an aid to the blockade of nearby Communist-held ports, and as a possible base for the conquest of the mainland. On August 23, 1958, Communist artillery began a very heavy bombardment of Quemoy which has continued with only an occasional lull. The shelling has seriously interfered with Nationalist efforts to supply the island. On September 15 Chiang warned the world that he would have to strike soon at the gun emplacements on the mainland because they were cutting his supply lines.

It now appears that if the present bombardment continues, the U. S. will be forced to choose among three alternatives: (1) assist Chiang with American air and naval power in a strike at Communist positions; (2) withdraw U. S. forces and seek to persuade Chiang to withdraw Nationalist forces from Quemoy and Matsu; (3) reach an agreement with Communist China in the Warsaw negotiations now being conducted.

If the U. S. were to follow the first alternative and join in an attack upon the mainland, it would place our country in a very dubious position in the eyes of the international community. In what way could the American government distinguish its action from the action taken by Communist China in the Korean war? In both cases, there would be clearly intervention in a civil war by an outside party. In the case of Korea this was considered to be "aggression" by the United Nations.

The Administration certainly would hesitate to withdraw U. S. forces and seek to persuade Chiang to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu, although this might well be preferable to a military conflict with Communist China. The third alternative seems to offer the most hope, provided President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles are ready to negotiate with a flexible attitude, including a readiness to make some concessions. However, if the Administration allows Chiang Kai-shek to dictate its position in the negotiations, little can be hoped for.

The President's speech of September 11 contained some questionable analysis and statements. In the first place, no mention was made of the fact that Chiang is unwilling to renounce the use of force in the Formosa situation. Since this is so, how can Communist China be persuaded to renounce the use of force? The President ignored the fact that a civil war between the Communists and Chiang has been in progress for many years, and that all parties concerned agree that Quemoy and Matsu are part of China. Although the use of armed force is to be regretted, it can hardly be said that the continuance of the civil war in an effort to bring more Chinese territory under Communist rule constitutes "aggression".

It would be a more honest statement of American policy to say that the Administration has decided that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu are essential to U. S. military security. However, this position is not supported by many military and political leaders.

On September 13, the Washington Post and Times Herald, which supported President Eisenhower in the elections, commented on the President's speech: "It repeated every tired cliche and false analogy about the situation in the Strait.....Apart from the altogether misleading comparison with Munich, the speech distorted history in other respects.....During the previous 5000 years of recorded history, the islands were under control of the mainland, even during the period when Japan held Formosa.."

The Republican Administration, as well as previous Democratic administrations, has consistently stressed the importance of the unity of the free world under the leadership of the U. S. It is important to recognize what our policy in the Far East is likely to do to that unity. The noted columnist, Walter Lippman, on September 18 commented as follows: "The President had a lot to say the other night about how our position in Asia would be hurt if we did not defend Quemoy. Has he realized what will be our position in Asia and in Europe and in Africa and in Latin America if he goes to war for Quemoy?"

In this connection it is also significant that the most recent decision against seating Communist China in the United Nations General Assembly was by a narrowing margin. In 1953 the vote was 44 to 10 with 2 abstentions. In 1957 the vote was 48 to 27 with 6 abstentions. In 1958 the vote was 44 to 28 with 9 abstentions.

1. It is clear that the U. S. must modify its foreign policy in the Far East. No longer can it give unqualified support to Chiang and his Nationalist regime on Formosa. The withdrawal of military forces from Quemoy and Matsu and any other islands close to the Communist mainland is essential if continued friction over them is to stop.

2. A long range solution to the future status of Formosa should be sought through the United Nations, a solution which will protect those Nationalists who have fled from Communism on the mainland and which will safeguard the rights of self-determination of the original Formosan people who compose a large majority of the island's population.

3. Furthermore, there must be a solution to the present impasse over the diplomatic status of Communist China, officially the Peoples Republic of China. Should not its representatives be seated in the UN? The possibility of the U. S. granting recognition to the Peoples Republic of China in an effort to resolve outstanding differences through normal diplomatic channels deserves exploration.

4. Finally, Communist China must be brought into the disarmament discussions in order that any agreements on the halting of nuclear tests and the establishment of inspection posts may apply to her as well as to other nations. She should also be included in world health programs which require the participation of all nations for full effectiveness. Present restrictions on travel and trade in peaceful goods should be modified in order that communication between peoples may be re-established and the free flow of ideas and commerce renewed.

Such policies are distinctly in accord with Christian doctrines concerning reconciliation and good will between nations. Christians, because they seek for a just and orderly world in which the conditions of peace may prevail, should support a program which offers a way out of the present tragic dilemma before escape becomes impossible.

Carl D. Soule
Daniel E. Taylor
Herman Will, Jr.

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"For this country the crucial fact in this dangerous situation is that President Eisenhower and Dulles are not free agents. They are not in control of American foreign policy. They have mortgaged their diplomacy to Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China on Formosa.

"We must pay close attention to Chiang. For it has become brutally plain that Chiang thinks he has the opportunity, and is determined to seize it, to embroil the United States in a war with the Chinese mainland.

"This has always been his ultimate purpose. For only in such a war could he conceivably realize his ambition to return to the mainland. . . What he means is that if we allow his planes to begin the attack, we with our planes will then have to take on what he has begun. Let us not be taken for a ride. . ."
(Walter Lippman, Chicago Sun Times, September 25)

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"Let us suppose that after Cornwallis' surrender the British had refused to recognize the finality of their defeat and, expressing their determination to return to the mainland, had withdrawn most of their forces to an imaginary island lying 100 miles off our Middle Atlantic coast. Let us suppose further that the Royal Navy and a few of King George's Redcoats had clung to Nantucket, Long Island and the Florida Keys, using these offshore islands as bases from which to interfere with American shipping and to launch occasional raids upon the mainland. How long would the Founding Fathers have tolerated such a situation?

"And how would the American people have felt toward France if, instead of aiding the American Revolution, Louis XVI and his Foreign Minister Vergennes had decided to back the British, had refused to accept their defeat and had sent Rochambeau's fleet to help the British defend their remaining island strongholds?" (James P. Warburg, N. Y. Times, Sept. 5)

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"It must be remembered that the retention of these offshore islands is not vital to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. They are important to the Nationalist regime chiefly because they provide the best opportunity for entangling the United States in a general war with China, which may help Chiang Kai-shek regain the mainland. . .

"The United States can make it crystal clear that it intends neither to reconquer China for Chiang nor to abandon Formosa and the Pescadores. At the same time, responsible policy makers must start thinking about eventual solution to the Formosa impasse. . .

"Because of their separate geography and their unique historical experiences, the 8,000,000 Formosans have come to possess a strong sense of national identity of their own. They are restive under the highhanded and to them foreign rule of the Nationalist Chinese; but they also have a healthy distaste for the Communists.

"A great majority of the Formosans want independence under a free, democratic government of their own. By the end of this year Formosan youth will comprise 70% of the Nationalist armed forces. Their suppressed aspirations are bound to explode into violent convulsions in the near future." (A Formosan in an unsigned letter printed in the Chicago Daily News, September 19)

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"The United States would be wise to follow the advice of many of its friends and allies and refuse to support the Nationalists on the offshore islands."
(London Times, September 8)

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"We seem to be drifting either dazed or indifferent, toward war with China, a war without friends or allies, and over issues which the Administration has not presented to the people, and which are not worth a single American life."
(Dean Acheson, September 6)